Abstract-A descending price algorithm based auction mechanism in a two-sided matching market is proposed in this paper to determine market clearing prices. For general valuations with a intelligent choice of reverse constricted sets, we prove that the algorithm converges in a finite number of rounds. Then specializing to the rank one valuations in sponsored search markets, the proposed algorithm yields the element-wise maximum market clearing price.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of matching in markets was first studied by Gale and Shapley in the seminal paper "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage" [1] . Soon thereafter a widely used mathematical model of two-sided matching markets was presented in the paper "The Assignment Game I: The Core" [2] by Shapley and Shubik. In [2] , the authors identify a set of prices that lead to a perfect matching between the sellers and the buyers, called market clearing prices. The set of market clearing prices is further shown to be set of solutions of a linear programming problem, and also shown to have a lattice structure, which guarantees the existence of the maximum/minimum price vector. The minimum price vector, which corresponds to the well-known Vickrey-ClarkeGroves price [3] , [4] , [5] , is well-studied. An ascending price auction approach was presented by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor in [6] starts at the zero-price vector and thereafter increases the posted price for all over-demanded goods to search for market clearing prices. Later on, de Vries, Schummer and Vohra modified the ascending price auction to yield the minimum market clearing price vector [7] .
Since the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold in matching markets [8] , different pricing mechanism may yield a higher expected profit than the VCG price for sellers when anticipating buyers' strategic behavior. Hence, algorithm design in search of the maximum market clearing prices is a problem deserving of study. Specialized to the single good auction, the ascending price auction, corresponding to second-price auction or English auction, gives the minimum price and the descending price auction, corresponding to firstprice auction or Dutch auction, yields the maximum one. An approximate descending price auction mechanism, presented by Mishra and Garg in [9] , yields price within |M | 1 of maximum market clearing price and can be extended to get market clearing price vector with at most double the error. 1 Given |M | is the the number of good and is the minimum bid decrement With the aim to exactly achieve the maximum market clearing price, designing a computationally efficient descending price auction algorithm is a preferred approach to accomplish the goal.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a matching market with a set M of distinct goods available for sale and a set of B buyers with each buyer i ∈ B having a non-negative valuation v ij ≥ 0 for good j ∈ M , and desiring at most one good among all the goods available.
Without taking strategic behavior into consideration, we can collect all the valuations together in a |B|×|M | valuation matrix V. Since we can always add dummy goods or dummy buyers, we can assume |B| = |M | = m without loss of generality; henceforth, this will be in force.
After that, define P = [P 1 P 2 ... P m ] is a price vector and U i,j = v i,j −P j is the payoff of buyer i if good j is allocated to it. Besides, define U * i be the maximum acceptable payoff of buyer i ∈ B, i.e. U * i = max{0, max j∈M v i,j − P j }. Then, the lined-up-buyer list of each good under P and the neighbor of a set are defined below. Definition 1. Under a set of price P, the lined-up-buyer list of good j is a set of buyers S s.t.
The neighbor of a set, denoted by N (S), is the largest set that for every vertex i ∈ N (S), there is an edge connecting i to at least one vertex in the set S.
By connecting each good with its lined-up buyers, we can construct a bipartite graph. With a bipartite graph, we define the reverse constricted set(a set of under-subscribed/underdemanded goods) and than review the definition of perfect matching and Hall's marriage theorem. Definition 3. A left-hand set S (of goods) in a bipartite graph is called a reverse constricted set if its size is greater than the size of its right-hand neighbors N(S) (of buyers).
Definition 4.
A bipartite graph is said to possess a perfect matching, if there is a sub-graph containing all vertices and each vertex has exactly one edge incident on it.
Hall's marriage theorem: A bipartite graph G with vertex sets V , U contains a perfect matching from V to U iff it satisfies the condition: |N (S)| ≥ |S| for every S ⊆ V , where N (S) ⊆ U is the set of neighbors of S in G.
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III. DESCENDING PRICE AUCTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a descending price algorithms converging in finite-time in search of market clearing prices. Then, we will state the maximum market clearing price returned by our algorithm in sponsored search markets. Detailed proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in [10] .
A. Descending price algorithm for general valuation matrix
Hall's marriage theorem points out that we can always find reverse constricted sets when there is no perfect matching. In the ascending price auction, the algorithm finds a set of overdemanded goods and increases the price of every good in the set. Therefore, an intuitive idea of designing the descending algorithm is to keep choosing reverse constricted sets and eliminating them in each iteration by reducing the prices of the goods in the set.
1) Initial Price Choice and Optimal Price Reduction: The first step of the algorithm is to set a "good" initial price vector for any descending price auction. To avoid checking some price vectors that cannot be market clearing prices, the initial price vector will be set as the least-upper-bound of market clearing prices market clearing price. Hence, we set P j = max i∈M v i,j , ∀j ∈ M as the initial price vector.
Second, in order to eliminate the reverse constricted set by price reduction, the optimal price reduction should be large enough to add at least one buyer not in the neighbor set of reverse constricted set good to be in the lined-up list of some good in the reverse-constricted set. Note that we do not want the price reduction procedure to exclude any possible market clearing prices. The optimal price reduction is derived in Lemma 1. Lemma 1. Given a set of goods S and price vector P, the minimum price reduction of all goods in this set that guarantees to add at least a new buyer to the set is
2) Skewness criterion for choosing reverse constricted sets: Choosing different reverse constricted sets may lead to different market clearing prices. In order to get a unique set of market-clearing prices, restricting the choice of reverse constricted sets is necessary. In our algorithm, we add two rules for choosing constricted sets: 1) Pick the reverse constricted sets with goods S with the largest difference |S| − |N (S)|. 2) If there are multiple reverse constricted sets with the same |S| − |N (S)|, then choose the reverse constricted set with the smallest size. The first rule is to find the most under-demanded set of goods. This also speeds up convergence. The second rule tries to find the size-wise minimal reverse constricted set fixing the value of |S| − |N (S)|. The intuition of the second rule is that we do not want to include any set of perfect-matched buyer-good pairs because the price reduction of these goods does not help in eliminating reverse constricted sets. These two rules are equivalent to searching for the most "skewed"
Algorithm 1 Skewed-set Aided Descending Price Auction
Input: A |B| × |M | valuation matrix V. Output: Vector of Market Clearing Price P 1: Initialization, set the price of good j, P j = max i∈B v i,j . 2: Construct the lined-up-buyer list graph. 3: while There exists a reverse constricted set do
4:
Choose the most skewed reverse constricted set S.
5:
For all j ∈ S, reduce P j by min i∈B\N (S),l∈S {max k∈M
if min j∈S P i < 0 then 7: Let c = − min j∈S P j . 8 :
end if 10: Construct the lined-up-buyer list graph. 11: end while 12: Return P.
reverse constricted set in the bipartite graph by defining a function to represent the skewness of a set. Then, we proved in Lemma 2 that the most skewed set is unique, and also a reverse constricted set when there is no perfect matching.
Lemma 2. The most skewed set in an m×m bipartite graph is always unique, and furthermore, is a reverse constricted set if the bipartite graph has no perfect matching.
With the proper initial price vector choice, optimal price reduction per round, and the choice of the most skewed set, the complete algorithm is discussed in Algorithm 1.
B. Convergence of the Algorithm
A potential function W (·) is used to prove that the algorithm terminates in a finite number of rounds. Since there is no reverse constricted set when a perfect matching exists, the most skewed set has skewness ≤ 1. This can be used as a criterion for an algorithm to produce market clearing prices.
Given a |M |×|M | bipartite graph G in a matching market, we can define the skewness of the graph W (G) to equal the skewness of the most skewed set. By defining a sequence W (G k ) = max S⊆M,S =∅ f k (S), where G k is the bipartite graph obtained at the k th iteration and f k (S) is the skewness of the most skewed set, we can show the convergence of the algorithm in a finite number of rounds by proving the sequence W (G k ) is a strictly decreasing sequence and the minimum difference between adjacent two elements is greater than some positive constant. Theorem 1. The skewed-set aided descending price algorithm terminates in finite rounds.
C. Algorithm in Sponsored Search Markets
A sponsored search market is a special kind of matching market that is applicable to a search engine that has multiple web slots for displaying ads, and where advertisers want to bid for the slots. A wildly used assumption in sponsored search market is the valuation matrix V is separable (i.e., a rank one matrix), which means v i,j can be represented as w i c j , where w i is an advertiser-dependent parameter representing the return obtained per impression, and c k is the click-through rate.
Since the valuation matrix become rank-1, several good properties in bipartite structure uniquely exists and yield the maximum market clearing price returned by our algorithm.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 always returns the maximum market clearing price vector in sponsored search markets.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a descending price algorithm in search of the set of market clearing prices. The algorithm is shown to terminate in finite rounds for any non-negative valuation matrix. Furthermore, we defined the skewness of a set, and proved that choosing the most skewed set in each round of price reduction will return the set of elementwise maximum market clearing price in sponsored search markets. Some open problems related to this work, such the returned market clearing price for a general valuation matrix, an efficient algorithm in search of the most skewed set, and the analysis of strategic concerns are deferred for future work.
